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Strategic Remanufacturing Decision in a Supply Chain with an External
Local Remanufacturer
Tiantian Xu
1
, Tiaojun Xiao, Jing Shi
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 210093 China
Abstract: This paper develops a model for remanufacturing decisions in a two-stage supply chain with one
manufacturer, one retailer and one external local remanufacturer, who collects used products and then reproduces
them into a new one if the manufacturer does not join in remanufacturing process. This paper is different from
most of the extant studies about remanufacturing because they consider decisions of firms rather than supply
chains. We mainly focus on the remanufacturing strategy of the manufacturer when there is a local
remanufacturer. We derive the equilibrium results for all players and do some comparative studies under different
cases. We find that product substitutability can invert the effect of manufacturer’s extension decision on the
retailer’s profit. We also consider the effect of channel structure by comparing the decentralized channel with the
centralized channel. We find that the manufacturer has a higher incentive to extend its product line in the
centralized channel than the decentralized channel; and the competition can strengthen its motivation to extend
the line.
Keywords: game theory, product line, remanufacturing, supply chain management
1. INTRODUCTION
Remanufacturing refers to economic process with recovering the end-of-life products, which were first
produced by original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Remanufactured product often has the same function as
the new one but cheaper, so it’s a good alternative choice for some consumers. It is well known that,
remanufacturing has a lower production cost and plays an important role in reducing environment burden.
Adding remanufactured product is also a conveniently way to extend product line, which can help OEM attract
more consumers and enlarge the market sale furthermore. However, an OEM may be not willing to participate in
remanufacturing because remanufactured product may cannibalize sales of the higher-margin new products, as
well as need a great amount of money to build a necessary reverse channel.
As a supply chain player, OEM’s decision can be influenced by other participants, such as retailer and local
remanufacturer. There exist some local remanufacturers, who have mature facilities for this process and will
always take back the end-life products and reproduce them into new ones. These reproduced products can
cannibalize the sales of the OEM’s. For example, some Chinese machine tool manufacturers are puzzled with
remanufacturing decisions because there is a big company Caterpillar extracts the big part of profit in this
industry. Thus, it is very important for the OEM to make a trade-off between the remanufacturing or not when
facing an outside competitor.
Channel structures can also have some effects on the OEM’s decision. Having a retailer can be efficient,
while they have advanced marketing strategy. However, a manufacturer just has its own sale channel just like
Dell. We will also consider different channels' impact on the OEM’s decision. In the centralized setting, we will
first consider the supply chain without a local remanufacturer to see the cannibalization effect in different
channel structures. Then we will look at the effect of the competition from a local remanufacturer if both sell
1 Corresponding author. Email: xutiantian1988@hotmail.com (Tiantian Xu); xiaotj@nju.edu.cn (Tiaojun Xiao)
838 The Twelfth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business——Emerging Operations & Services Management Track
products themselves. We first consider a situation without a local remanufacturer, so the system can be modeled
as a Stackelberg game, where the OEM is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Then, we will consider the
effect of the competition between the local remanufacturer and OEM on equilibrium outcome.
We have the major findings if there is a retailer in the distribution channel. Both retail and wholesale prices of
the new product are lower if there is remanufactured product, and the competition will further decrease the
prices for the new one. The OEM will have a higher incentive to extend product line if there is an outside
competitor. From the comparison between the centralized and the decentralized channel, we know that if both
OEM and local remanufacturer use their own channels, then the OEM will prefer to participate in
remanufacturing to avoid the competition from other player. The competition is fierce in the centralized one.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Our work is closely related to two categories of research, one is remanufacturing decision while the other is
product line design strategy.
There are many papers discuss remanufacturing related problems, for example, reverse channel design
strategies [1], price and quantity decisions for the remanufactured product [2], remanufacturing decisions and so
on. Savaskan et al. [1] consider the reverse channel selection problem and give out a coordination mechanism to
induce the best collection effort for the retailer. Our paper is closely related to remanufacturing decision, which
is often considered under the two-period condition [3-7]. Some of them did not consider the difference between
the remanufactured and the new one. Majumder and Groenevelt [3] consider the impact of competition on the
OEM’s decisions both in the first and second periods. Others talk about the remanufactured product’s
cannibalization effect on the new product. Debo et al. [4] think about the production technology selection and
pricing decisions from a manufacturer's view. Ferguson and Toktay [5] give out the condition under which the
monopolist manufacturer will not join in remanufacturing. They also consider the manufacturer’s entry-deterrent
strategies when facing the external remanufacturing competition. Atasu et al. [7] think that there exists a green
segment, while regard remanufacturing as a strategic marketing strategy. They show that price discrimination is
a good strategy to defend the external competition. All the papers study the decisions without considering the
retailers’ reaction. Since there are always some interactions between manufacturers and retailers, we will focus
on the remanufacturing strategy in a supply chain.
This paper is also related to papers talking about product line design strategies. Moorthy [8] considers a
monopolist’s product line design and pricing decisions, then Villas-Boas [9] extends the problem in a
distribution channel and gives out the condition, under which the intermediary will carry all the products. Desai
[10] then considers the effects of cannibalization in a product line problem. Product line problems are then
considered together with other problems, such as different consumer choice modes [11-12], different introduction
sequence [13-15] and advertisement related factors and so on. Liu and Cui [16] consider the product line decision
in a supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. We consider the product line length decision of the
OEM facing with an outsider competitor and concern the impact of competition on product line decision. This
paper will consider the product extension decision of the OEM facing with the competition from local
remanufacturer under different channel structures.
This paper contributes to the literature by considering the remanufacturing strategy in a supply chain with a
external remanufacturer. We mainly focus on the interaction among the players instead of decisions in different
periods. Additionally, we investigate the effects of the competition on the OEM’s product line decisions.
3. THE BASIC MODEL
We consider a supply chain with one original equipment manufacturer (OEM), one local remanufacturer and
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one retailer, where all products are sold to consumers through the retailer. And all players are doing decisions
based on their profits. As we only consider a single period, we assume the returns quantity and demand are
independent of each other [17]. That is, we do not consider the constraints from the demands of the forward
systems on the acquisition quantity of end-of life products. Since the market scale of the remanufactured product
is smaller than the new one, this can be true in a mature market.
Firstly, we consider a supply chain without a remanufacturer to derive the optimal condition, under which the
OEM will invest in remanufacturing. The OEM and the retailer play a Stackelberg game to decide the optimal
prices. When there is a local remanufacturer, the OEM’s remanufacturing strategy may be different because
products from local remanufacturer can be regarded as a threat.
The time sequence of this game is as follows:
(i) The manufacturer decides whether to remanufacture the used product or not.
(ii) If the OEM participates in remanufacturing, he decides the wholesale prices for both new and
remanufactured products; if he does not participate in remanufacturing, the local remanufacturer joins the
market; and they decide the wholesale prices simultaneously.
(iii) The retailer decides the retail prices for both products.
We have the following notations:
i
a
: the market size for product i , ,i n r= ,
n r
a a> ;
d : the substitutability of the two products, 0 1d< < ;
r
c
: unit remanufacturing cost, including acquisition cost of used product;
n
c
: unit manufacturing cost of the new product;
F
: fixed cost when OEM joins in remanufacturing;
p : retail price for the new product when there is no remanufactured products;
w
: wholesale price for the new product when there is no remanufactured products;
r
π
: the profit function of retailer when there is no remanufactured product;
m
π
: the profit function of OEM when there is no remanufactured product;
c
π
: the profit function for the centralized channel when there is no remanufactured products;
j
π
: the profit function of player j ( ,j R M= )when OEM reproduces;
C
π
: the profit function for the centralized channel when OEM reproduces;
1mπ : the profit function of player m ( , ,m R M L= ) when local remanufacturer reproduces;
Cj
π
: the profit function for player n ( ,n R L= ) in the centralized channel.
We assume that the remanufactured product is distinguishable from the new product, demand for the new
product is ( , )
n n r n n r
D p p a p dp= − + , while the demand for remanufactured product can be expressed
as: ( , )
r n r r r n
D p p a p dp= − + . Here, d means product substitutability, where 0d = means two product are
fully different, while 1d = means they can be a fully substitutes for each other. When there is no
remanufactured product in the market, we assume the demand for the remanufactured one as zero [3] by setting
r r n
p a dp= + , so the demand for new one is: ( ) ( ) (1 )
n r
D p a da d p= + − − .
When there is only one product in the market, the profit for the retailer is
( , ) ( )
r
p w D p wπ = − , (1)
which is a concave function of p , i.e., 22 ( , ) 2/ 2 0
r
p p dwπ∂ ∂ = − + < . By solving the first-order
condition ) 0( , /
r
p w pπ∂ ∂ = for p , we obtain the best reaction function ( )
2(1 ) 2
n r
a da
w
p w
d
+
= +
−
.
By considering the reaction function of the retailer, the profit function for the OEM ( , ) ( )
m n
w p w c Dπ = − can
be expressed as
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1
( )[) ) ]
2
( (1
n n rm
w c a daw d wπ − + − −= , (2)
which is a concave function of
w
. By solving the first-order condition, we can have the optimal wholesale
price *
(1 )
2(1 )
n n r
a d c da
w
d
+ − +
=
−
. Inserting *w into (2) and retailer’s reaction, we can have the equilibrium profit
for the OEM and the optimal retail price, furthermore we can have the retailer’s profit
*
2[ (1 ) ]
8(1 )
n n r
m
a c d da
d
π
− − +
−
= , (3)
*
2[ (1 ) ]
16(1 )
r
r
n n
a c d da
d
π
− +
=
−
−
. (4)
4. OEM’S REMANUFACTURING STRATEGY
4.1. OEM participates in remanufacturing
If the OEM participates in remanufacturing, the profit function of OEM can be expressed as
( , , , ) ( ) ( )
M n r n r n n n r r r
p p w w D w c D w c Fπ = − + − − , (5)
where the first (second) term mean profit from the new (remanufactured) product while the third term is the
fixed cost for remanufacturing, including reverse channel investment built cost, process set up cost,
administration cost, and so on.
In this way, the retailer’s profit can be expressed as
( , , , ) ( ) ( )
R n r n r n n n r r r
p p w w D p w D p wπ = − + − , (6)
By using backward induction technique, we can solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the
Stackelberg game, and the extension range as well in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (i) When the fixed cost satisfy:
2
1 1 1
21
(1 ) (1 )
8(1 )
0
A B d d C
d
F F
+ − − +
−
< < = , the OEM will join in
remanufacturing, where 2 21 2n r n rA a a a a d= + + ,
2 2
1 2 2 2n r r r n n n rB c c a c a c c c d= + − − − ,
2
1 [ (1 ) ]n n rC a c d da= − − + ;
(ii) When the OEM joins in remanufacturing, the optimal wholesale prices for the two products are
2
*
2
(1 )
2(1 )
n r n
n
a a d c d
w
d
+ + −
=
−
,
2
*
2
(1 )
2(1 )
r n r
r
a a d c d
w
d
+ + −
=
−
.
Proof.With two products, the retailer decides both the retail prices at the same time. Since the Hessian matrix
of
R
π
over ( , )
n r
p p
is
2 2
2 2
d
d
−⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, which is negative definite following from 0 1d< < . Solving the
first-order conditions / 0
R n
pπ∂ ∂ = and / 0
R r
pπ∂ ∂ = , we have the retailer’s reaction function
2
2
(1
( )
2
)
2
n r n
n n
a a d d w
p w
d
+ + −
=
−
and
2
2
(1
( )
2
)
2
r n r
r r
a a d d w
p w
d
+ + −
=
−
. (7)
Inserting ( )
n n
p w
and ( )
r r
p w
into (5), we can obtain ( , )
M n r
w wπ
. We can show that ( , )
M n r
w wπ
is a
concave function of ( , )
n r
w w
. Solving the first order conditions ( , ) / 0R
M n r n
w w wπ∂ ∂ = and
( , ) / 0
M n r r
w w wπ∂ ∂ = , we can have
2
*
2
(1 )
2(1 )
n r n
n
a a d c d
w
d
+ + −
=
−
,
2
*
2
(1 )
2(1 )
r n r
r
a a d c d
w
d
+ + −
=
−
. Further, we can
obtain the SPNE retail prices:
*
*
2 22( )1
n r n
n
a a d w
p
d
+
= +
−
,
*
*
2 22( )1
r n r
r
a a d
w
p
d
+
= +
−
, and equilibrium profits
2 2
*
2 2 2
2
2 (1 )( 2 2 2 )
8(1 )
n r n r n r r r n n n
M
r
a a a a d d c c a c a c c c d
F
d
π
+ + + − − −
−
=
+ −
− ; (8)
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22
*
2
2 2 22 ( 2 2 2 )(1 )
16(1 )
n r r r n n n rn r n r
R
a a a a d c c a c a c c c d d
d
π
+ + + + − − −
−
=
−
. (9)
Comparing Equation (3) with (8), we know that if * *
M m
π π> , OEM will participate in remanufacturing, so we
can have the extension range for OEM, that is,
10 F F< < . ■
Proposition 1 shows that OEM will participate in remanufacturing only when the fixed cost is under certain
amount. Since the expression of the remanufacturing boundary is complex, we will carry out sensitivity analysis
on it later on. We can also see from the equilibrium wholesale price for the new product that it will increase with
both market sizes of the two products. On one hand, OEM may increase the new product’s wholesale price to
gain a large marginal profit if the own market scale increases; on the other hand, when the market scale of the
remanufactured one increases the demand for the new one can be increased as well for substitution effect. And
the wholesale price for the remanufactured one has the same effect. By differentiating the equilibrium wholesale
price with respect to
d
, we can have *
2
/ 0
2(1 )
n r
n
a a
w d
d
+
∂ ∂ = >
−
, which means that OEM will increases
wholesale price due to the enlarged market size.
By comparing the equilibrium decisions before and after extension, we have the following.
Corollary 1.When OEM participate in remanufacturing, the prices satisfy * *
n
w w< and * *
n
p p< .
From Corollary 1, we can see that both the retail and wholesale prices are lower under remanufacturing. As
there is a competitive product in the market, the retailer may want to decrease price to attract more consumers.
The OEM may then cut prices of the products to compensate the retailer.
4.2. Local remanufacturer participates in remanufacturing
When OEM does not participate in remanufacturing, the local remanufacturer will do that. And we assume
the local remanufacturer has its own reverse channel and production capacity. Both of them sell their products
through a common retailer, in this way, the profit for the retailer can be expressed as (6).
So the profit function for the OEM is
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) ( )M n r n r n n np p w w D w cπ = − . (10)
The profit of the local remanufacturer is
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) ( )L n r n r r r rp p w w D w cπ = − . (11)
Proposition 2 summarizes the range, under which OEM will join in remanufacturing if there exists a local
remanufacturer and the wholesale prices.
Proposition 2. (i) If there is a local remanufacturer, OEM will join in remanufacturing
when
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2
2 2 2 2
(4 ) [(4 ) 4 ](1 )
0
8(1 )(4 )
A d d B C d
F F
d d
− + − − −
< < =
− −
, where 2 22 [2 ( ) (2 )]n r r nC a a c d c d= + + − − ; (ii) the
wholesale price for the new one is *1 2
2 2 ( )
4
n n r r
n
a c a c d
w
d
+ + +
=
−
, while the wholesale price for the
remanufactured is *1 2
2 2 ( )
4
r r n n
r
a c a c d
w
d
+ + +
=
−
.
Proof: By inserting the reaction functions (7) into (10) and (11), we
obtain 1 1 11 1 1
1
( )( )( , )
2 n r nM n n nr
w c a dw ww wπ − + −= ; 1 1 11 1 1
1
( )( )( , )
2 r n rL n r rr
w c a dw ww wπ − + −= . By solving the
first-order conditions 1 1 1 1( , ) / 0M n r nw w wπ∂ ∂ = and 1 1 1 1( , ) / 0L n r rw w wπ∂ ∂ = for ( , )n rw w , we can obtain the
optimal wholesale prices for both new and remanufactured product: *1nw and
*
1rw . Furthermore, we can obtain
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the equilibrium retail prices
*
* 1
1 2 22(1 )
n r n
n
a a d w
p
d
+
= +
−
and
*
* 1
1 2 22(1 )
r n r
r
a a d
w
p
d
+
= +
−
, while the equilibrium profits
2 2
*
1 2 2
[2 ( ) (2 )]
2(4 )
n r r n
M
a a c d c d
d
π
+ + − −
=
−
; (12)
2 2
*
1 2 2
[2 ( ) (2 )]
2(4 )
r n n r
L
a a c d c d
d
π
+ + − −
=
−
. (13)
By comparing Equation (8) with (12), we know that if there is a local remanufacturer, OEM will extend its
product line when * * 1M Mπ π> , that is 20 F F< < . ■
We can show the differences among the wholesale prices under different conditions through numerical
examples, and default values of parameters are used as follows: 40,
n
a = 25,
r
a = 0.35,d = 2,
n
c = and
1.4
r
c = . Figure 1 illustrates the effect of substitutability on equilibrium wholesale prices.
Figure 1. New product’s wholesale price versus substitutability
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
40
50
60
70
*
w
*
n
w
*
1nw
d
wholesale price
As can be seen in Figure 1, when the local remanufacturer joins in remanufacturing, the wholesale price for
the new product is lower than the OEM does itself. That is, when there is the competition in the market, both
players will decrease the price to attract more consumers. Though, we have already shown that the wholesale
price is higher when there is just one product in the market, we can see from Figure 1 that the difference
between the wholesale prices increases with product substitutability. That is, when product substitutability is
high, the wholesale price difference is great.
To well understand the effect of competition, we define
2 2 2
1
1 2 1
2
2 2 2
(4 ) (1 ) 4(1 )
8(1 )(4 )
d d
F
C C
d
F
d
d
F =
− + − −
− −
∆ = − .
Figure 2 shows the effect of substitutability on 1F∆ .
We can see from Figure 2 that the extension range is widened by the competition. To avoid the
cannibalization from the local remanufacturer, the OEM is willing to pay much to reduce the lost caused by the
outsider competitor. We can also see that, 1F∆ increases with market size, which is obvious for market scale
increasing can help OEM to gain more profit. When product substitutability is higher, the difference of the range
of extension becomes larger when there is a local manufacturer. As product substitutability increases, the
competition increases, so OEM has a higher incentive to invest in remanufacturing to gain a higher profit.
Figure 3 illustrates the profit for the retailer under different conditions. Firstly, we consider the profit for the
retailer if there is no local remanufacturer. When product substitutability is sufficiently low, having two products
from OEM can make a higher profit than just holding just new one. Selling two differentiated products can help
retailer attract more consumers and gain a higher profit. However, when product substitutability is high, just
holding one product is more profitable. Higher substituted remanufactured product cannibalizes the demand of
the new one, while the marginal profit is lower. So the profit for the retailer is lower under this condition.
Additionally, the retailer’s profit can be high if it sales products from not only OEM but also the local
remanufacturer. As product line extension dampens the price competition, both OEM and local remanufacturer
reduce their prices to compete for market, and in this way the retailer can make a larger marginal profit through
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product line pricing.
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r
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r
π
*
R
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Figure 2. 1F∆ versus product substitutability Figure 3. Retailer’s profits versus product substitutability
5. REMANUFACTURING STRATEGY IN THE CENTRALIZED CHANNEL
5.1. Without remanufactured product
In the centralized case, we firstly consider the condition without remanufacturing. And the channel profit can
be expressed as
( ) ( )
c c c c n
p D p cπ = − (14)
We can show that ( )
c c
pπ
is a concave function of
c
p
. Thus, by solving the first-order condition, we can have
the optimal retail price *
(1 )
2(1 )
n r n
c
a a d c d
p
d
+ + −
=
−
. Inserting *
c
p
into (14), we obtain the equilibrium profit
2
* [ (1 ) ]
4(1 )
n n r
c
a c d a d
d
π
− − +
=
−
. (15)
5.2. OEM produces remanufactured product
If the manufacturer produces the remanufactured products, it has to decide the retail prices for both the new
and the remanufactured products, simultaneously.
The profit function for the manufacturer can be expressed as
( , ) ( ) ( )
C cn cr cn cn n cr cr r
p p D p c D p c Fπ = − + − − , (16)
where the first part is the profit of the new product and the second part means the remanufactured products
profit.
Proposition 3 shows the condition, under which OEM will take a part in remanufacturing in the centralized
channel.
Proposition 3. When
2 2
1 1
23
1(1 )
4( )
1
1
( )
0
A d B C
F F
d
d+ −
<
−
−
+
< = , the OEM will join in remanufacturing in the
centralized condition.
Proof. From (16), we know the Hessian matrix over ( , )
cn cr
p p
is negative definite. Differentiating
( , )
c cn cr
p pπ
with respect to
cn
p
and
cr
p
respectively and solving the first-order condition, we can have the
equilibrium retail prices for both new and remanufactured products:
2
*
2
(1
2(1
)
)
n r n
cn
a a d c d
p
d
+ + −
=
−
,
2
*
2
(1
2(1
)
)
r n r
cr
a a d c d
p
d
+ + −
=
−
. We can further obtain the equilibrium profit for the manufacturer.
2 2 2 2 2
2
* 2 (1 )( 2 2 2 )
4( )
=
1
n r n r n r n n r r n
C
r
a a a a d d c c a c a c c c d
F
d
π
+ + + − + − − −
−
−
(17)
By comparing equation (15) with (17), we can have the following extension range
30 F F< < . ■
5.3. OEM does not produce remanufactured product
If the OEM and the local remanufacturer sell their products through their own channels, we can obtain their
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profit functions as following
1 1 1 1( , ) ( )CM cn cr cn cn np p D p cπ = − ,
(18)
1 1 1 1( , ) ( )CL cn cr cr cr rp p D p cπ = − . (19)
Proposition 4. When
2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2 2 24
2(4 ) [(4 ) 4 ](1 )
4(1 )( )
0
4
A d d B C
F
d
F
d d
< <
− + − − −
− −
= , the OEM will join in
remanufacturing in the centralized condition.
Proof. By solving the first-order conditions of (18) and (19), we can have the optimal retail prices
*
1 2
2 2 ( )
4
n n r r
cn
a c a c d
p
d
+ + +
=
−
and * 1 2
2 2 ( )
4
r r n n
cr
a c a c d
p
d
+ + +
=
−
, we can further have the equilibrium profits for
the two players
2 2
2
*
2
[2 ( ) (2 )]
(4 )
n r r n
CM
a a c d c d
d
π
+ + − −
−
= , (20)
2 2
2
*
2
[2 ( ) (2 )]
(4 )
r n n r
CL
a a c d c d
d
π
+ + − −
−
= . (21)
By comparing (17) and (20), we can have the extension range. ■
In the central line, we still define the competition effect by:
2 2 2 2
1 2
4 22 3 2 2
(4 ) 4(1 )
4(1 )(4 )
(1 )d C d
F
C
d
d
F F
d
+
∆ = − =
− − −
− −
,
which has the same structure as 1F∆ , but larger than the case in the decentralized condition, that is 1 2F F∆ < ∆ ,
which means the competition effect is larger in the centralized channel as OEM will be the only one to bear the
loss of competition.
By considering Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, we have Corollary 2, which shows differences of extension range in
the different backgrounds.
Corollary 2. (i) If there is no local remanufacturer: 1 3F F< ; (ii) If there exists a local manufacturer: 2 4F F< .
From Corollary 2, we know that in the centralized condition, the product extension range is larger than the
decentralized condition. That is, OEM is more likely to extend its line in the central channel, which is because in
the decentralized channel OEM always bears all the extending cost, so it has a lower incentive to extend the line.
6. CONCLUSIONS
If OEM reproduces a used product, the demand of the new products can be influenced by product
substitutability. In this article we explore the condition, under which OEM will take a part in this process with
an outside competitor. We first consider this problem in a decentralized channel with three players to see the
effect of the competition from both inside and outside. Then we consider channel effect through a centralized
case.
Our analysis gives some managerial insights for supply chain players. From the OEM’s perspective, it will
have a higher incentive to extend the product line by adding a remanufactured product if there is a local
remanufacturer in the market. Furthermore, if it decides sell product itself instead of an intermediate retailer, he
will be better off extending the product line. From the point of the retailer, holding two products from
independent manufacturers can be profitable. However, when there is only an OEM in the market, selling just
new one is benefit for the retailer when the product substitutability is large.
Here we just assume that retailer has no power but sells products from the OEM. Nonetheless, the retailer can
be reluctant when holding two products with lower profit than just having a new one. In the future, we can
consider the setting where the retailer is powerful enough to choose the products instead of hold the whole line.
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Our work can be extended in the several other ways as well. Firstly, the quality difference of the new and the
remanufactured can be endogenous to better show the competition effect. Secondly, if available quantity and
price of the used product be considered would be valuable, while quantity and quality of used products can be a
constraint for some OEM. Finally, consumer utility function can be used to better understand the consumer
behavior.
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